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The state-of-the-art British-sponsored fast-
track assessment of the global impacts of climate
change, a major input to the much-heralded Stern
Review on the Economics of Climate Change, indicates
that through the year 2100, the contribution of
climate change to human health and environ-
mental threats will generally be overshadowed by
factors not related to climate change. Hence, cli-
mate change is unlikely to be the world’s most
important environmental problem of the 21st
century.
Analysis using both the Stern Review and the
fast-track assessment reveals that notwithstand-
ing climate change, for the foreseeable future,
human and environmental well-being will be
highest under the “richest-but-warmest” sce-
nario and lower for the poorer (lower-carbon)
scenarios. The developing world’s future well-
being should exceed present levels by several-fold
under each scenario, even exceeding present well-
being in today’s developed world under all but the
poorest scenario. Accordingly, equity-based argu-
ments, which hold that present generations
should divert scarce resources from today’s
urgent problems to solve potential problems of
tomorrow’s wealthier generations, are unpersua-
sive.
Halting climate change would reduce cumu-
lative mortality from various climate-sensitive
threats, namely, hunger, malaria, and coastal
flooding, by 4–10 percent in 2085, while increas-
ing populations at risk from water stress and
possibly worsening matters for biodiversity. But
according to cost information from the UN
Millennium Program and the IPCC, measures
focused specifically on reducing vulnerability to
these threats would reduce cumulative mortality
from these risks by 50–75 percent at a fraction of
the cost of reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs).
Simultaneously, such measures would reduce
major hurdles to the developing world’s sustain-
able economic development, the lack of which is
why it is most vulnerable to climate change. 
The world can best combat climate change
and advance well-being, particularly of the
world’s most vulnerable populations, by reducing
present-day vulnerabilities to climate-sensitive
problems that could be exacerbated by climate
change rather than through overly aggressive
GHG reductions.
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Introduction
Most future scenarios suggest that the
world will get more populated and wealthier
during this century. Although this should
advance human well-being, it may also
increase climate change, which might in turn
at least partly offset, if not overwhelm, any
advances in well-being that would have
occurred absent climate change. The U.N.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
reports in its 2001 assessment that modest
global warming (1 to 2°C over 1990 levels)
could increase global economic product with
gains in the higher-latitude, developed coun-
tries, more than offsetting losses in develop-
ing countries.1 However, global temperature
increases beyond that could reduce global
economic product and wreak substantial
environmental damage.
Such considerations have led influential
politicians such as former British prime min-
ister Tony Blair, former U.S. president Bill
Clinton, and former French President Jacques
Chirac, to proclaim that climate change is the
most important environmental problem fac-
ing the globe this century and, unless checked
drastically, would before long reduce human
and environmental well-being.2
This study examines whether climate
change is in fact the world’s most pressing
environmental and human health problem
and considers the merits of mitigation (that
is, policies that would restrict emissions or
concentrations of greenhouse gases) versus
adaptation (policies that would reduce or
take advantage of the impact of the climate
change caused by greenhouse gas emissions)
to address whatever problems are created or
exacerbated. In short, careful analysis reveals
that through the foreseeable future, climate
change exacerbates existing environmental
and human health problems, but only to a
modest degree relative to contributions from
other factors not related to climate change.
Hence, the threats posed by climate change
are more robustly and cost-effectively
addressed, at least in the short- to medium-
term, by policies that address the underlying
causes of the environmental and human
health problems that are exacerbated by cli-
mate change. 
The data and projections used in this
study come primarily from two reports: 
• The “fast-track assessment” (FTA) of the
global impacts of climate change, spon-
sored by the U.K. Department of Environ-
ment, Forests and Rural Affairs; and
• The Stern Review on the economics of
climate change.
The Fast-Track Assessment
The FTA of the global impacts of climate
change was published in a special issue of
Global Environmental Change: Part A edited by
Martin Parry.3 This is supplemented, as nec-
essary, by other DEFRA-sponsored studies.
Many, if not most, authors of these papers
have served as coordinating lead authors,
lead authors, or contributing authors of the
IPCC’s third and fourth assessment reports.
Parry is, moreover, the current chairman of
the IPCC’s Work Group II, which oversees
the impacts, adaptation and vulnerability
sections of the assessments.
Like all estimates of the impacts of climate
change, the FTA’s analyses are plagued with
uncertainties resulting from the fact that such
estimates are derived using a series of linked
models with the uncertain output of each
model serving as the input for the next model.
To compound matters, each model is neces-
sarily a simplified representation of reality. 
The chain of models typically starts with
emission models, which are driven by various
socioeconomic assumptions about the next
100 years or more in order to generate emis-
sion scenarios extending to the latter part of
this century. But even users of these emission
scenarios acknowledge that 2085 is at the
outer limit of the foreseeable future because
socioeconomic predictions beyond that
point are too speculative.4 Even 2085 is likely
too great a stretch. For instance, a paper com-
missioned for the Stern Review noted that








only to a modest
degree relative to
other factors.
be projected semi-realistically for more than
5–10 years at a time.”5
Emission scenarios are used to drive models
to estimate future trends in atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations. Those concen-
trations are then used to model the amount of
heating (or “radiative forcing” ) of the climate
system which is next fed into coupled atmos-
phere-ocean general circulation models to esti-
mate spatial and temporal changes in climatic
variables, which are in turn used as inputs to
simplified and often inadequate biophysical
models that project location-specific biophysi-
cal changes pertaining to the resources that are
affected by climate change (e.g., vegetation and
other species, crop, or timber yields). 
The finer the spatial scale of the analysis,
the greater the uncertainties in climatic vari-
ables. But because the resources that are affect-
ed by climate change are spatially heteroge-
neous—as are the socioeconomic conditions
that affect those resources and determine
whether and how human beings will respond
to changes—it is more appropriate to do the
biophysical impacts analysis at the local scale
than at larger regional or national scales. 
Finally, depending on the human or nat-
ural system under consideration, the outputs
of these biophysical models may have to be
fed into additional models to calculate the
social, economic, and environmental impacts
on those systems, including the calculation
of regional and global scale impacts through
the use of trade models. 
In addition to the cascading uncertainties
that propagate from model to model—the
cumulative effects of which have yet to be
quantified—the results of these impact
assessments are subject to potentially large
systematic errors which tend to substantially
overstate negative impacts while simultane-
ously understating positive impacts of cli-
mate change. Those systematic errors are due
to the fact that the assessments generally do
not account fully, if at all, for the increases in
adaptive capacity resulting from
• increases in wealth postulated under the
socioeconomic assumptions used to
generate emissions scenarios; and
• the creation of new or improved tech-
nologies that would come on line over
time, because technology accrues over
time.6
In other words, the impact assessments
are inconsistent with the assumptions built
into the emissions scenarios used to drive cli-
mate change.
Despite these shortcomings, for the pur-
poses of this study I will, for the most part,
take the results of the FTA at face value
because it has figured prominently in the
international debate on global warming and
because it allows us to develop estimates of
the relative contribution of climate change to
various climate-sensitive problems in the
future.7 Like the FTA, this paper does not
consider low-probability but potentially
high-consequence outcomes such as a shut-
down of the thermohaline circulation or the
melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice
sheets. They are deemed unlikely to occur
during this century if they occur at all.8
Stern Review
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change was commissioned from Nicholas
Stern, the erstwhile chief economist of the
World Bank, by the then-chancellor of the
exchequer, Gordon Brown, on behalf of the
British government. It was released on October
30, 2006. The Stern Review estimated that
unmitigated climate change will reduce welfare
by an amount equivalent to a reduction in con-
sumption per capita of 5–20 percent “now and
forever” if one accounts for market and non-
market impacts and the risk of catastrophe.9 It
also suggested that by the year 2200, the 95th
percentile of the equivalent per capita GDP
losses could rise to 35.2 percent.10
Several researchers have disputed the Stern
Review’s impact estimates and consider them
greatly overblown.11 The review’s authors
themselves emphasize “strongly” that the
numbers should not “be taken too literally.”12
I will, nevertheless, put aside these concerns











estimate whether unmitigated climate change
will lower future well-being to below today’s
levels. Specifically, I will assume for the sake
of argument that climate change under the
warmest scenarios will result in a welfare loss
equivalent to 35.2 percent of GDP in 2100. 
IPCC Scenarios of the Future
In 2000, the IPCC developed four “families”
of greenhouse emissions scenarios to depict
what the future might look like given different
assumptions about demographic, technologi-
cal, economic, and social trends during the
period 1990–2100. This study is primarily con-
cerned with exploring, in light of the results of
the FTA and Stern Review, the implications for
human well-being and environmental quality
in four scenarios, with each scenario represent-
ing one family. 
The IPCC scenarios are less predictions
than they are inputs for “if-then” calculations.
That is, the scenarios (sometimes called “story-
lines”) represent plausible futures that serve as
grist for the analytic mill. Scenarios are often
preferred to predictions because predictions of
the above mentioned socioeconomic trends
that determine emissions over the course of the
next 100 years are extremely unreliable. 
The FTA report employed emission sce-
narios developed by the IPCC’s Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios to project future climate
change from 1990 (the base year for each sce-
nario) through 2100.13 The emissions scenar-
ios assume that no new policies or measures
will be implemented to reduce damages from
climate change. This assumption virtually
guarantees that negative impacts will be over-
estimated, while positive impacts will be
underestimated. 
The dominant characteristics of the “story-
lines” used in those scenarios are shown in
Table 1. Table 1 also provides corresponding
estimates for the atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions, temperature increases, and sea level rise
that result from each scenario through 2085.14
Those impact calculations are the product of
chained computer simulations discussed in






as grist for the
analytic mill.
Table 1
Characteristics and Assumptions of Various Scenarios
Scenario
A1FI A2 B2 B1
Population in 2085 (billions) 7.9 14.2 10.2 7.9
GDP growth factor, 1990–2100 525–550 243 235 328
GDP/capita in 2085, Global average $52,600 $13,000 $20,000 $36,600
GDP/capita in 2100
Industrialized countries $107,300 $46,200 $54,400 $72,800
Developing countries $66,500 $11,000 $18,000 $40,200
Technological change Rapid Slow Medium Medium
Energy use Very high High Medium Low
Energy technologies fossil regionally “dynamics high 
intensive diverse as usual” efficiency
Land use change Low–medium Medium–high Medium High
CO2 concentration in 2085 810 709 561 527
Global temp change (°C) in 2085 4.0 3.3 2.4 2.1
Sea level rise (cm) 34 28 25 22
Sources: N. W. Arnell, “Climate Change and Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions and Socio-Economic Scenarios,”
Global Environmental Change 14, no. 1 (2004): Tables 1, 6, 7; and R. J. Nicholls, “Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss
in the 21st Century: Changes under the SRES Climate and Socio-Economic Scenarios,” Global Environmental Change
14, no. 1 (2004): Tables 2 and 3. GDP and GDP/capita are in 1990 U.S. dollars. Note: Global temperature change is based
on the HadCM3 model.
The columns in this and most subsequent
tables are arranged by scenario in the order of
decreasing global temperature changes. Using
the labels provided by the IPCC, these scenar-
ios from left to right are A1FI (warmest), A2,
B2, and B1 (coolest).15
The FTA used these climate change pro-
jections to estimate the global impacts on
various climate-sensitive threats which also
serve as determinants of human and environ-
mental well-being.16 With respect to threats
affecting human well-being, the FTA ana-
lyzed hunger, water stress, coastal flooding,
and malaria.17 With respect to environmental
well-being, the FTA projected the net biolog-
ical productivity of the terrestrial biosphere
(as measured by its ability to fix carbon in
vegetation, i.e., sequester carbon as biomass)
and the global extent of coastal wetlands and
croplands.18
Wealth Creation, Technological Advance,
and Climate Change
Although climate change can lead to a
deterioration of many human health and envi-
ronmental metrics, that does not tell us what
we really want to know. What we want to
know is this: Will human health and environ-
mental quality be better under richer but
warmer scenarios than under poorer but cool-
er scenarios? That’s primarily because wealth
creation, human capital, and new or improved
technologies often reduce the extent of the
human health and environmental “bads”
associated with climate change more than
temperature increases exacerbate them.
The data in Table 1 suggests that, on one
hand, the impacts of climate change should
decrease as one goes from scenario A1FI on
the left to B1 on the right (in accordance with
the pattern of declining climate change, ceteris
paribus). On the other hand, economic and
technological development—both critical
determinants of adaptive capacity—ought to
attenuate the impacts of climate change.19
Considering future levels of economic and
technological development, that attenuation
should be greatest for the A1FI scenario, fol-
lowed by the B1, B2 and A2 scenarios, in that
order. Thus, even though the A1FI scenario
has the greatest amount of warming and thus,
the largest amount of climate change, it would
not necessarily have the worst outcomes.
That’s because it should also have the highest
degree of adaptive capacity.
Economic growth broadly increases human
well-being by increasing wealth, technological
development, and human capital. These factors
enable society to address virtually any kind of
adversity, whether it is related to climate or not,
while specifically increasing society’s capacity to
reduce climate change damages through either
adaptation or mitigation.20 Many determinants
of human well-being—hunger, malnutrition,
mortality rates, life expectancy, the level of edu-
cation, and spending on health care and on
research and development—improve along
with the level of economic development, as
measured by GDP per capita.21
Increasing wealth also improves some,
though not necessarily all, indicators of envi-
ronmental well-being. Wealthier nations have
higher cereal yield (an important determinant
of cropland, which is inversely related to habi-
tat conversion) and greater access to safe water
and sanitation. They also have lower birth
rates.22 Notably, access to safe water and access
to sanitation double as indicators of both
human and environmental well-being, as does
crop yield, since higher yield not only means
more food and lower hunger, it also lowers
pressure on habitat.23
Cross country data also indicate that for a
fixed level of economic development, these
indicators of human and environmental well-
being (e.g., malnutrition, mortality rates, life
expectancy, access to safe water, crop yields,
and so forth) improve with time (because tech-
nology almost inevitably improves with
time).24 Similarly one should expect, all else
being equal, that society’s ability to cope with
any adversity, including climate change,
should also increase with the passage of time. 
Thus, over time, the combination of eco-
nomic and technological development should
increase society’s adaptive capacity which, bar-
ring inadvertent maladaptation, ought to











This is evidenced, for example, in the remark-
able declines—99 percent or greater—during the
20th century in mortality and morbidity rates
in the United States for various water-related
diseases, e.g., typhoid, paratyphoid, dysentery,
malaria and various gastrointestinal diseases.26
This study highlights the tension between
the public health and environmental improve-
ments associated with wealth creation and
technological advance on one hand and the
countervailing negative impacts on the same
from increased greenhouse gas emissions on
the other hand. By and large, as I will show, the
FTA and Stern Review confirm that richer and
warmer worlds will not necessarily have lower
levels of human and environmental well-being
than poorer but cooler worlds. 
The Impact of Climate
Change–Four Scenarios
In this section I present the FTA’s scenario
estimates of the populations at risk in 2085
with and without climate change for four cli-
mate-sensitive threats to human well-being—
hunger, water stress, coastal flooding, and
malaria—and on a number of environmental
indicators that are also sensitive to climate. 
When comparing the population at risk
from these threats without climate change
with the population at risk from these threats
with climate change, a couple of issues should
be kept in mind.
First, the A1FI and B1 scenarios are
assumed by the IPCC to have the same popu-
lation in 2085. That assumption, however, is
dubious. In the real world, lower total fertili-
ty rates are generally associated with higher
levels of economic development.27 Hence, the
A1FI world should have a lower population
in 2085 than the B1 world. Accordingly, the
populations at risk in the A1FI scenario are
probably overestimated relative to the B1 sce-
nario. Likewise, relative to the B1 scenario,
greenhouse gas emissions and associated cli-
mate changes are probably overestimated in
the A1FI scenario because emissions would
be lower in a less-populated world. That, too,
leads to higher estimates of the population at
risk in the A1FI scenario relative to the B1
scenario.
Second, neither the FTA studies nor the
Stern Review deal very satisfactorily with
endogenous adaptation. Some FTA studies
(e.g., the ones for hunger and coastal flood-
ing) allow for some “spontaneous” adaptive
responses because it should be expected that
even in the absence of new governmental
policies, people would employ existing tech-
nologies to protect themselves from econom-
ic or bodily harm even in a “business-as-
usual” world. Yet the study for water stress
doesn’t allow for any adaptation. And even
where the FTA studies allow for some adap-
tation, they limit the range of available tech-
nological options to currently available tech-
nologies.28 But we should expect that the
menu of technological options would be
much broader, more cost-effective, and more
affordable in the future under any scenario
because of the following:
• The world will be wealthier under any of
the scenarios (see Table 1) and, there-
fore, better able to develop, afford, and
implement new as well as improved
technologies;
• Technology will, through the accretion
of knowledge, advance, even if society
doesn’t get any wealthier; and
• Even in the absence of specific policy
changes, new and improved technologies
will inevitably be developed to specifical-
ly cope with the negative impacts of cli-
mate change. 
Hence, limiting adaptation between now
and 2085 to “current” technologies is tanta-
mount to estimating today’s food produc-
tion based on the technology of 1920 (or ear-
lier). Any such estimate is bound to underes-
timate food production and overestimate
hunger.29 In our case, doing so overestimates
the population at risk in all scenarios, but the
overestimates are greatest for the A1FI sce-
















The FTA’s estimates of population at risk
for hunger in 2085 both with and without
climate change for the various scenarios are
shown in Table 2. These estimates, which
assume CO2 fertilization in the event of cli-
mate change, show that under every scenario
the world will be better off in 2085 with
respect to hunger than it was in 1990 despite
any increase in population. 
There are three conclusions that one can
draw from Table 2:
• The cooler scenarios (B2 and B1) do not
yield markedly less hunger than the
hottest scenario (A1FI). The hottest sce-
nario actually yields less hunger than
two of three cooler scenarios. But for the
FTA’s systematic overestimates of the
populations at risk of hunger in the
A1FI world relative to the B1 world, the
A1FI scenario might have resulted in the
lowest overall levels of hunger with or
without climate change.
• For some scenarios (A2 and, possibly, B2),
climate change might, in fact, reduce the
incidence of hunger at least through 2085.
• For each scenario, the additional popu-
lation at risk from hunger because of cli-
mate change alone is smaller than the
population at risk from hunger without
climate change. Through 2085 at least,
the impact of climate change is sec-
ondary to the impact of other factors.
The estimates in Table 2 are based on the
assumption that atmospheric CO2 will
improve crop yields. If that does not prove to
be the case, then climate change would
increase the total population at risk under all
scenarios. Even so, the additional population
at risk of hunger due to climate change
would still be less than the population at risk
of hunger without climate change in all but
the A1FI scenario.30 But such outcomes are
unlikely because the probability that direct
CO2 effects on crop growth are zero or nega-
tive is slight, particularly since future soci-
eties, especially the A1FI society, should have
a greater capacity to adapt. 
The Stern Review argues, based on a study
by Long et al., that the beneficial effect of car-
bon fertilization has been overestimated.31
Accordingly, it uses the results from FTA’s
hunger study that assumes “no fertilization.”
But in fact, Long et al. estimate that the CO2
fertilization effect could be a third to half as
large in areas where insufficient nitrogen is
applied or if crops are not well-watered, not
zero.32 Even so, a peer-reviewed paper that
evaluated the Long et al. study found that
their analysis was “incorrect, being based in




Population at Risk in 2085 for Hunger
Population at Risk in the Additional Population at Total Population
Absence of Climate Change Risk Because of Climate Change at Risk
Units Millions Percentage of Millions Percentage of Millions Percentage of 
Global Population Global Population Global Population
Baseline 1990 798 to 872 15.1 to 16.5 798 to 872 15.1 to 16.5
A1FI 2085 105 1.3 28 0.4 133 1.7
A2 2085 767 5.4 –28 to –9 –0.2 to –0.1 739 to 758 5.2 to 5.3
B2 2085 233 2.3 –11 to 5.0 –0.1 to 0.05 222 to 238 2.2 to 2.3
B1 2085 90 1.1 10 0.1 100 1.3
Source: M. L. Parry et al., “Effects of Climate Change on Global Food Production under SRES Emissions and Socio-Economic Scenarios,” Global
Environmental Change 14, no. 1 (2004): 53–67.
Moreover, the Long et al. study justified its
low estimate of the fertilization effect by argu-
ing that nitrogen usage per hectare is lower in
the developing world than in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Although that might be true today, increased
use of nitrogen is precisely the kind of adapta-
tion that would become more affordable in the
future as countries, even developing countries,
become wealthier. Indeed, this is one of the
autonomous adaptations allowed under the
FTA study.34 In addition, the development of
crops that would be drought-resistant and/or
utilize nitrogen more efficiently is among the
more active areas of crop research.35
While the contribution of climate change
to the total population at risk from hunger in
2085 seems large (21 percent), it results from a
small (2 percent) warming-related drop in
future global food production between 1990
and 2085.36 In other words, unmitigated
warming would reduce the annual growth in
food productivity from 0.84 percent per year
to 0.82 percent per year. This suggests two
things. First, a small decline in the rate of pro-
ductivity growth—perhaps “forced” by the
assumption that no new technologies will
develop autonomously to adapt to climate
change—would lead to disproportionately
large effects in terms of the population at risk
from hunger.37 Second, a small boost in annu-
al productivity of the food and agricultural
sector could go a long way toward ensuring
that hunger does not increase in the future.
Finally, the estimates provided in Table 2
indicate that in order to compare the conse-
quences of various scenarios, it is insufficient
to examine only the impacts of climate
change. One should also look at the total level
of hunger. Otherwise, based merely on an
examination of the population at risk from
climate change alone, one could conclude,
erroneously, that, with respect to hunger, A2 is
the best of the four worlds examined. But,
based on either the total population at risk or
the proportion of the global population at
risk, A2 would be the worst of the four scenar-
ios for hunger. This also illustrates that efforts
focused on minimizing the consequences of
climate change to the exclusion of other soci-
etal objectives might actually reduce overall
human welfare.
Water Stress
The FTA’s estimates of the population at
risk for water stress in 2085 with and without
climate change are shown for each scenario in
Table 3.38 A population is deemed to be at risk
if available water supplies fall below 1,000 m3
per capita per year. The populations at risk in
Table 3 reflect the fact that, because of cli-
mate change, some populations will move in
and out of the water stressed category. 
Table 3 clearly demonstrates that the
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Table 3
Population at Risk in 2085 for Water Stress
Population at Risk in the Additional Population at Total Population
Absence of Climate Change Risk Because of Climate Change at Risk
Units Millions Percentage of Millions Percentage of Millions Percentage of 
Global Population Global Population Global Population
Baseline 1990 1,368 25.8 1,368 25.8
A1FI 2085 2,859 36.2 –1,192 –15.1 1,667 21.1
A2 2085 8,066 56.8 –2,100 to 0 –14.8 to 0 5,966 to 8,066 42.0 to 56.8
B2 2085 4,530 44.4 –937 to 104 –9.2 to 1.0 3,593 to 4,634 35.2 to 45.4
B1 2085 2,859 36.2 –634 –8.0 2,225 28.2
Source: N. W. Arnell, “Climate Change and Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions and Socio-Economic Scenarios,” Global Environmental Change 14,
no. 1 (2004): p. 41, Table 8.
warmest (and richest) scenario has the least
total water stress.
This is all the more striking given that the
calculations informing Table 3 assume zero
adaptation despite the ready availability of
time-tested adaptive responses on both the
supply and demand side (e.g., water storage
facilities to augment water supplies during
drier periods, or water pricing and other con-
servation measures).39 Thus it overestimates
the populations at risk in all scenarios. These
overestimates, however, are greatest for the
A1FI (richest) scenario and lowest for the A2
(poorest) scenario. Although the ranking
among the scenarios would not change, the
differences in the populations at risk
between the various scenarios would have
been magnified had adaptation been consid-
ered.
Coastal Flooding
The FTA’s estimates of the population at
risk for coastal flooding with and without any
climate change between 1990 and 2085 are
shown in Table 4. Note that sea level will rise
relative to the land not only because of climate
change but also because the land may subside
for a variety of reasons not related to climate
change (e.g., extraction of water, gas, or oil
under the coastline). In this table, population
at risk is measured by the average number of
people who would experience coastal flooding
by a storm surge in 2085 with and without cli-
mate change, assuming that populations
would be attracted preferentially to the coast
and that some adaptations would occur with a
30-year lag time.40 The low and high end of the
ranges for populations at risk for each entry in
Table 4 assume low and high subsidence due
to non-climate-change-related human causes,
respectively. 
The main conclusion one draws from
Table 4 is that the warmest and richest sce-
nario (A1FI) produces only slightly larger
coastal flooding damages than the coolest
scenario (B1). This conclusion is at least par-
tially due to the fact that although the calcu-
lations in Table 4 make a creditable effort to
incorporate improvements in adaptive capac-
ity due to increasing wealth, some of the
underlying assumptions are questionable. 
For instance, the scenarios in Table 4 allow
societies to implement measures to reduce the
risk of coastal flooding in response to 1990
surge conditions, but ignore such changes due
to subsequent sea level rise.41 But one would
expect that whenever any measures are imple-
mented, society would consider the latest
available data and information on the surge
situation at the time the measures are initiat-
ed. That is, if the measure is initiated in, say,
2050, the measure’s design would at least con-
sider sea level and sea level trends as of 2050,
rather than merely the 1990 level. 
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Table 4
Population at Risk in 2085 for Coastal Flooding 
Population at Risk in the Additional Population at Total Population
Absence of Climate Change Risk Because of Climate Change at Risk
Units Millions Percentage of Millions Percentage of Millions Percentage of 
Global Population Global Population Global Population
Baseline 1990 10 0.2 10 0.2
A1FI 2085 1 to 3 0 10 to 42 0.1 to 0.5 11 to 45 0.1 to 0.6
A2 2085 30 to 74 0.2 to 0.5 50 to 277 0.4 to 2.0 80 to 351 0.6 to 2.5
B2 2085 5 to 35 0 to 0.3 27 to 66 0.3 to 0.6 32 to 101 0.3 to 1.0
B1 2085 2 to 5 0 to 0.1 3 to 34 0 to 0.5 5 to 39 0 to 0.5
Source: R. J. Nicholls, “Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss in the 21st Century: Changes under the SRES Climate and Socio-Economic Scenarios,” Global
Environmental Change 14, no. 1 (2004).
The calculations also allow for a constant
lag time between sea level rise and initiating
protection. But one should expect that if sea
level continues to rise, the lag between
upgrading protection standards and higher
GDP per capita will be reduced over time.
Moreover, it is conceivable that the richer a
society is, the faster the adaptation. In fact, if
data confirms that trends in sea level rise are
robust, it is possible that protective measures
may be taken in advance, i.e., the lag times
may even become negative, even in a “busi-
ness-as-usual” world.
In addition, these calculations do not allow
for any deceleration in the preferential migra-
tion of the population to coastal areas, which
is not unlikely if coastal flooding becomes
more frequent and costly. Alternatively, if
migration to the coasts continues unabated, a
country’s expenditures on coastal protection
might increase because its coastal population
increases relative to its total population. 
Finally, the scenarios used in Table 4
assume that subsidence is more likely under
the A1FI world than the B1 and B2 worlds.
That assumption contradicts real world experi-
ence which indicates that once richer countries
are convinced of a problem, whether environ-
ment or health related, they generally respond
quicker to remedy the problem, spend more,
and have greater environmental protection
than poorer ones, especially at the high levels of
development that, as indicated in Table 1, are
projected to exist virtually everywhere later this
century under all of the IPCC scenarios.42
Hence, one should expect that the richest
(A1FI) world would spend more and be better
protected from subsidence than would the B1
(and A1 and B2) worlds. 
Malaria 
The study used in the FTA’s analysis for
malaria provides estimates for changes in
global population at risk due to climate
change, but not for populations at risk in the
absence of climate change.43 As we saw in
Table 2, the scenario with the highest popula-
tion at risk due to climate change does not
always have the highest total population at
risk, and the latter is a more relevant measure
of human well-being. Thus, the published
analysis doesn’t allow us to determine whether
the contributions to malaria would be domi-
nated by climate change or other factors.44
Nor does it tell us whether well-being (as mea-
sured by the total population at risk for malar-
ia) would be greater in a richer-but-warmer
world compared to poorer-but-cooler worlds.
In order to answer these questions, I will
use the results of an earlier version of the FTA
of the global impact of climate change.45 That
earlier analysis used a “business-as-usual” sce-
nario—the so-called IS92a scenario—devel-
oped for the 1995 IPCC impact assessment. It
neither included any additional greenhouse
gas controls nor allowed for any adaptation.
Under that scenario, the global population
and average GDP per capita in 2085 were pro-
jected at 10.7 billion and $17,700 (in 1990
$U.S.).46 The UK Meteorological Office’s
HadCM2 model projected that under this sce-
nario, average global temperature would
increase by 3.2°C between 1990 and 2085,
which approximates the temperature increase
using HadCM3 under the A2 scenario.47
That study’s results for malaria are sum-
marized in Table 5. The study indicates that
the global population at risk of malaria
transmission in the absence of climate
change would double from 4,410 million in
1990 to 8,820 million in 2085, while the addi-
tional population at risk due to climate
change in 2085 would be between 256 mil-
lion and 323 million. In other words, climate
change would contribute only a small por-
tion (no greater than 3.5 percent) of the total
population at risk for malaria in 2085.48
Note that the current range of malaria is
dictated less by climate than by human adapt-
ability. Despite any global warming that
might have occurred so far, malaria has been
eradicated in richer countries, although it was
once prevalent there in earlier centuries, and it
sometimes extended into Canada and as far
north as the Arctic Circle.49 This is because
wealthier societies have better nutrition, better
general health, and greater access to public












controlling diseases in general and malaria in
particular. In other words, today’s wealthier
and more technologically advanced societies
have greater adaptive capacity, and that is
manifested in the current geographic distribu-
tion of malaria prevalence around the globe.50
The fact that malaria is a significant health
risk only in the poorest of countries reaffirms
the importance of incorporating adaptive
capacity—and changes in future adaptive
capacity due to economic growth and techno-
logical change—into impact assessments. In
fact, analysis suggests that malaria is function-
ally eliminated in a society whose annual per
capita income reaches $3,100.51 But as shown
in Table 1, even under the poorest (A2) sce-
nario, the average GDP per capita for develop-
ing countries is projected to be $11,000.
Hence, few, if any, countries ought to be below
the $3,100 threshold in 2085. Moreover, given
the rapid expansion in our knowledge of dis-
eases and development of the institutions
devoted to health and medical research, the
$3,100 threshold will almost certainly drop in
the next several decades as public health mea-
sures and technologies continue to improve
and become more cost-effective. 
Ecological Changes in
2085–2100
Thus far, we’ve examined the impact of cli-
mate change on human well-being. But cli-
mate change will also affect global ecology. In
particular, climate change will have an impact
on the terrestrial biosphere’s ability to remove
carbon from the atmosphere (i.e., “sink” car-
bon in the biosphere), the expanse of cropland
(a crude measure of the amount of habitat
converted to agricultural uses, which is per-
haps the single largest threat to global terres-
trial biodiversity),52 and the expanse of coastal
wetlands.
Table 6, derived from the FTA, summa-
rizes the impact that warming might have on
these ecological indicators in each of the four
scenarios discussed thus far. 
Under each scenario, net carbon sink capac-
ity is higher in 2100 relative to 1990 because
the positive effect of carbon fertilization will
not have been offset by the negative effects of
higher temperatures during that period. Sink
capacities under the warmest scenarios (A1FI
and A2) are approximately the same in 2100,
and greater than the sink strengths under the
cooler scenarios (B1 and B2). 
Partly for the same reason and also
because of its low population, the amount of
cropland is lowest for the A1FI world, fol-
lowed by the B1 and B2 worlds. (Cropland
estimates were not provided for the A2 sce-
nario). Thus, through the foreseeable future,
the A1FI scenario would have the least habi-
tat loss and, therefore, pose the smallest risk
to terrestrial biodiversity, while the cooler
scenarios would have the highest habitat
losses.
Regarding the loss of coastal wetlands, esti-
mated losses due to sea level rise for each sce-
nario are substantial. But the contribution of
climate change to total losses in 2085 is small-
er than losses due to subsidence from other










Population at Risk in 2085 for Malaria (millions)
Baseline 1990 2085
Population at risk in the absence of climate change 4,410 8,820
Additional population at risk because of climate change 256 to 323
Total population at risk 4,410 9,076 to 9,143
Source: N. W. Arnell et al., “The Consequences of CO2 Stabilization for the Impacts of Climate Change,” Climate
Change 53 (2002): 413–46.
wetland losses are much higher for the A1FI
scenario than for the B1 and B2 scenarios, but
this is due mainly to the assumption that
under A1FI, societies would take fewer or less
effective measures to alleviate non-climate-
change-related subsidence which, as noted, is
suspect.54
Is Climate Change 
the Most Important
Environmental Problem for 
the Foreseeable Future?
A review paper in Nature claims that glob-
al warming may have been responsible for
about 0.17 million deaths worldwide in
2000.55 This estimate is based on an analysis
which was put out under the auspices of the
World Health Organization. However, the
authors of that analysis acknowledge that
climate change occurs against a back-
ground of substantial natural climate
variability, and its health effects are
confounded by simultaneous changes
in many other influences on popula-
tion health. . . . Empirical observation
of the health consequences of long-
term climate change, followed by for-
mulation, testing and then modifica-
tion of hypotheses, would therefore
require long time-series (probably sev-
eral decades) of careful monitoring.
While this process may accord with the
canons of empirical science, it would not pro-
vide the timely information needed to
inform current policy decisions on GHG
emission abatement, so as to offset possible
health consequences in the future.56
In other words, the 0.17 million estimate
should be viewed with skepticism since science
was admittedly sacrificed in hot pursuit of a
predetermined policy objective. But, absent
serendipity, one cannot base sound policy on
poor science.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this








Indicator Measurement 1990 A1FI A2 B2 B1
CO2 concentration (in 2100) ppm 353 970 856 621 549
Net carbon sink capacity with 
climate change (in 2100) Pg C/yr 0.7 5.8 5.9 3.1 2.4
Area of cropland with climate change % of global
(in 2100) land area 11.6 5.0 NA 13.7 7.8
Losses of coastal wetlands due to sea % of 
level rise alone (1990–2085) current area 5–20 3–14 3–15 4–16
Losses of coastal wetlands due % of 
to other causes (1990–2085) current area 32–62 32–62 11–32 11–32
Combined losses of coastal % of 
wetlands (1990–2085) current area 35–70 35–68 14–42 14–42
Sources: Nigel W. Arnell et al., “The Consequences of CO2 Stabilization”; Indur M. Goklany and David A. King,
“Climate Change and Malaria,” Letter, Science 306 (2004); Robert J. Nicholls, “Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss in
the 21st Century: Changes under the SRES Climate and Socio-Economic Scenarios,” Global Environmental Change
14, no. 1, (2004): 69–86; and P. E. Levy et al., “Modeling the Impact of Future Changes in Climate, CO2 Concentration
and Land Use on Natural Ecosystems and the Terrestrial Carbon Sink,” Global Environmental Change 14, no. 1 (2004):
21–30.
at face value. An annual death rate of 0.17 mil-
lion would constitute 0.28 percent of global
mortality.57 Data from the WHO, however,
indicates that climate change doesn’t even
make the top 10 global health risk factors
related to food, nutrition, and environmental
and occupational exposure. Specifically, the
WHO attributes 
• 1.12 million deaths in 2001 to malaria; 
• 3.24 million deaths to malnutrition;58
• 1.73 million deaths to unsafe water, in-
adequate sanitation, and hygiene; 
• 1.62 million deaths to indoor air pollu-
tion from indoor heating and cooking
with wood, coal, and dung; 
• 0.8 million deaths to urban air pollu-
tion; and 
• 0.23 million deaths to lead exposure.59
Climate change is clearly not the most
important environmental, let alone public
health, problem facing the world today.
Is it possible that in the foreseeable future,
the impact of climate change on public health
could outweigh that of other factors? To shed
light on that question, let’s translate the pop-
ulations at risk in Tables 2, 4 and 5 for hunger,
coastal flooding, and malaria into “ball park”
estimates for mortality assuming (1) that the
mortality scales linearly with populations at
risk between 1990 and 2085, and (2) that there
has been no change in mortality for these
threats between 1990 and 2001.60
Because Table 5 for malaria only has infor-
mation regarding the IS92a scenario, addi-
tional assumptions are necessary to derive
mortality for each of the four standard scenar-
ios. Specifically, with respect to malaria, mor-
tality estimates for each of the four IPCC sce-
narios are derived by assuming that (1) in the
absence of climate change, population at risk
scales linearly with the global population in
2085 under each scenario, and (2) the ratio of
the additional population at risk due to cli-
mate change to the population at risk absent
climate change varies with the square of the
ratio of the global temperature change.61
Note that the methodology used to trans-
late populations at risk into mortality proba-
bly overestimates the latter because it doesn’t
allow for increases in adaptive capacity due to
both economic development and technologi-
cal progress (or time). However, this would be
consistent with the methodologies used in the
impacts assessments in that they don’t account
for either new technologies for combatting
hunger or increasing wealth and new tech-
nologies for treating malaria. In any case, both
mortality without climate change and the
increase in mortality due to climate change
alone should be overestimated to the same
degree. Because impact analyses generally
underestimate changes in adaptive capacity,
mortality estimates are probably overestimated
for each scenario, with larger overestimates for
the wealthier scenarios.
Table 7 shows results for mortality with-
out climate change, the increase in mortality
due to climate change alone, and the sum of
the two in 2085 for each scenario. In order to
keep Table 7 simple, it shows only the mor-
tality using the upper bound estimate for the
population at risk under each scenario. 
This table shows that for each scenario, the
contribution of climate change to the total
mortality burden from malaria, hunger, and
coastal flooding is substantially smaller than
that due to other factors. The former varies
from 3.6 percent for the B2 scenario to 10.3
percent for the A1FI scenario. Thus, if cli-
mate change were halted at its 1990 level, it
would reduce the mortality burden in 2085
from these three factors by no more than, for
example, 10.3 percent for the warmest but
wealthiest A1FI scenario, corresponding to
237,000 deaths out of a possible 2,304,000.
These results, in conjunction with those
from Table 3 for populations at risk of water
stress and Table 6 for ecological indicators,
indicate that the effect of non-climate-
change-related factors generally outweighs
the effect of climate change with respect to
either human or environmental well-being.
Climate change is therefore unlikely to be the
most important environmental problem
confronting human or environmental well-
being, at least through the foreseeable future.
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Are Richer and Warmer
Worlds Worse Off Than
Poorer but Cooler Worlds?
Climate change will leave future genera-
tions poorer than they otherwise would have
been absent climate change. But would net
welfare necessarily be reduced below today's
levels? To answer this question, I rely on the
data produced by the Stern Review, which
estimated that unmitigated climate change
will reduce welfare by an amount equivalent
to a reduction in consumption per capita of
5–20 percent “now and forever” if one
accounts for market and nonmarket impacts
and the risk of catastrophe.62 It also suggests
that by the year 2200, the 95th percentile of
the equivalent per capita GDP losses could
rise to 35.2 percent.63
Table 8 uses the Stern Review to estimate
net welfare per capita under each of the four
scenarios. It provides estimates of welfare
losses assuming unmitigated climate change
and adjusts the GDP per capita in 2100
downward to account for those losses assum-
ing that they would increase with the square
of the average global temperature increase
from 1990 to 2085 indicated in Table 1.
Table 8 indicates that, notwithstanding
the Stern Review’s gross inflation of the
adverse impacts of climate change, welfare
should be higher in 2100 than it was in 1990.
Remarkably, even after accounting for cli-
mate change, welfare in developing countries
(on average) should be higher in 2100 than it
was for developed countries in 1990 for all
but the A2 scenario. 
This calls into question arguments that
present generations are morally bound to take
aggressive actions now to mitigate climate
change because future generations’ well-being
will otherwise be worse. Future generations
will not only be better off, they should also
have at their disposal better and more effective
technologies to address not just climate
change but any other sources of adversity. 
Most striking, however, is the fact that
well-being in 2100 should, in the aggregate,
be highest for the richest-but-warmest (A1FI)
scenario and lowest for the poorest (A2) sce-
nario. This conclusion was reached despite
the previously noted tendency of impact
analyses to overestimate net adverse impacts,
especially for wealthier societies.
If future well-being is measured by per capi-
ta income adjusted for welfare losses due to
climate change, the surprising conclusion





be highest for the
richest-but-
warmest scenario
and lowest for the
poorest scenario.
Table 7
Deaths in 2085 Resulting from Hunger, Malaria, and Coastal Flooding (thousands)
1990 A1FI A2 B2 B1
Baseline 2085 2085 2085 2085
Mortality in absence of climate change
Hunger 3,240 407 2,976 904 349
Coastal flooding 8 2 59 28 4
Malaria 1,120 1,657 2,977 2,143 1,657
(Subtotal ) 4,368 2,067 6,012 3,075 2,010
Change in mortality due to climate change 
Hunger 0 109 -35 19 39
Coastal flooding 0 42 222 53 27
Malaria 0 95 96 44 26
(Subtotal ) 0 237 282 116 92
Total mortality 4,368 2,304 6,295 3,191 2,102
Sources: Tables 2, 4, and 5.
future generations will be better off in the rich-
est but warmest world (A1FI) world. This sug-
gests that, if protecting future well-being is the
objective of public policy, governmental inter-
vention to address climate change ought to be
aimed at maximizing wealth creation, not
minimizing CO2 emissions. 
Costs and Benefits of
Mitigation and Adaptation
In the near term, mitigation (that is, mea-
sures to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse
gas concentrations) will have little or no
impact on reducing the impacts of climate
change due to the inertia of the climate sys-
tem. However, over time, mitigation will have
a greater impact. 
In Table 9, I show the impact of two miti-
gation scenarios on human mortality and
habitat loss for three of the key scenarios
examined thus far.64 The two mitigation sce-
narios represent the two poles at either end of
the spectrum in terms of stringency, namely,
the Kyoto Protocol at the low end of effec-
tiveness and cost and, at the high end, a sce-
nario that would ensure no climate change
beyond 1990 levels. These decreases, derived
from Tables 3, 6, and 7, are shown relative to

















GDP per Capita (in 1990 Dollars) for Developing and Industrialized Countries in 2100
1990 2100
Actual A1FI A2 B2 B1
Temperature increase 
in 2085 [°C] — 4.0 3.3 2.4 2.1
Developing Countries
GDP per capita, 
no climate change $875 $66,500 $11,000 $18,000 $40,200
Maximum cost of 
climate change* 0 $23,408 $2,635 $2,281 $3,900
Net consumption per capita, 
with climate change $875 $43,092 $8,365 $15,719 $36,300
Industrialized Countries
GDP per capita, 
no climate change $14,500 $107,300 $46,200 $54,400 $72,800
Maximum cost of 
climate change* 0 $37,770 $11,069 $6,894 $7,063
Net consumption per capita, 
with climate change $14,500 $69,530 $35,131 $47,506 $65,737
* Assuming (a) climate change will reduce welfare by 35.2% for A1FI in 2100 (see text), (b) welfare losses vary with
the square of the average global temperature change, and (c) the cost of climate change in 1990 is zero.
Sources: R. Warren et al. “Understanding the Regional Impacts of Climate Change,” Tyndall Centre Working Paper no.
90, 2006, prepared for the Stern Review, http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/twp90.pdf; N. W. Arnell,
“Climate Change and Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions and Socio-Economic Scenarios,” Global Environmental
Change 14, no.1 (2004): pp. 31–52, World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006), and Stern Review on The
Economics of Climate Change, 2006.
To construct this table, I optimistically
assumed that by 2085 the Protocol would
reduce climate change, as represented by the
changes in global temperature and sea level, by
7 percent, which would then reduce the
impacts of climate change on malaria, hunger,
and water stress by a like amount, and the
impacts of coastal flooding by 21 percent.65
This is based on research published by Thomas
Wigley, which estimates that if the Kyoto
Protocol were to be fully implemented, it would
reduce the amount of warming in the 2080s by
no more than 7 percent.66 As will become evi-
dent, however, the validity of the arguments
and conclusions in this paper hold regardless of
the assumptions about the effectiveness of the
Kyoto Protocol in reducing climate change. 
Table 9 demonstrates that, at least through
2085, the effects of mitigation could be a
mixed bag—declines in mortality from malar-
ia, hunger, and coastal flooding but increases
in populations at risk from water stress and
decreases in the habitat available for other
species. This illustrates one of the major short-
comings of mitigation, namely, mitigation is
indiscriminate—it reduces all impacts, wheth-
er they are positive or negative. 
Table 9 also demonstrates that the bene-
fits of the Kyoto Protocol are relatively trivial
compared to the magnitudes of the problems
that it would address. For example, it would
reduce cumulative mortality for malaria,
hunger, and coastal flooding by 0–1 percent,
compared to 4–10 percent if climate were to
be somehow frozen at its 1990 level. 
Those relatively trivial benefits, however,
would cost significant amounts of money.
For instance, if the Kyoto Protocol were fully
implemented by all signatories (including
the United States and Australia), it would
likely cost Annex 1 countries at least $165 bil-
lion per year in 2010, a figure on the lower
end of the range of estimates produced by the
IPCC’s 2001 report.67 The cost of the no-cli-
mate-change scenario, assuming it’s even fea-
sible, would be far greater than that, but the
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Impact of Mitigation Policies, 2085–2100
A1FI (richest-but-warmest) A2 (poorest) B1 (coolest)
No Climate No Climate No Climate
Kyoto Change Kyoto Change Kyoto Change
Protocol after 1990 Protocol after 1990 Protocol after 1990
Decline in mortality from 
malaria, hunger and 
coastal flooding (in 21 237 51 282 10 92
thousands)* in 2085 (1%) (10%) (1%) (4%) (0%) (4%)
Decline in population at 
risk from water stress (in -83 -1,192 -44 -234
millions)* in 2085 (-5%) (-72%) 0 0 (-2%) (-11%)
Habitat available for the Small Small   
rest of nature measured decrease decrease
by extent of cropland in available Larger in available Some
in 2100 habitat decrease NA NA habitat decrease
Sources: Tables 3, 6, and 7; and Indur M. Goklany, “A Climate Policy for the Short and Medium Term: Stabilization
or Adaptation?” Energy & Environment 16 (2005): 667–80. Note: The negative sign in the second–to-last row (for
water stress) indicates that mitigation will make matters worse in 2085. The figures in parentheses indicate the percent
declines in total mortality from malaria, hunger, and coastal flooding (or populations at risk from water stress) under
the control scenarios. NA = not available. 
literature doesn’t provide any good cost esti-
mates for such a scenario.
Focused Adaptation
As indicated in Table 7, suspending cli-
mate at its 1990 level at a cost somewhere
above $165 billion annually would leave
90–96 percent of the mortality problem for
the three listed threats unsolved. By contrast,
policies focused on solving the whole prob-
lem not only would have a larger target of
opportunity (namely, 100 percent of the
problem) but would likely prove more cost-
effective than mitigation. Focusing on the
former will necessarily enhance human well-
being more than policies that would only
mitigate climate change. 
Moreover, measures that would reduce vul-
nerability to the non-climate-change-related
portion of the problem would also reduce the
component related to climate change.68 In
particular, policies and measures that would
reduce present day vulnerabilities to climate-
sensitive problems would also reduce similar
problems in the future, whether they are
caused by climate change or other factors. For
instance, a successful malaria vaccine would
help reduce malaria cases regardless of
whether the avoided cases would be due to cli-
mate change or other factors. 
Such an approach—which I will call
“focused adaptation”—would, unlike mitiga-
tion, bring substantial benefits in the near-to-
medium term. That is mainly due to the fact
that mitigation will not affect mortality due to
the non-climate-change-related component of
the threat. As shown in Table 7, mortality
from hunger, malaria, and coastal flooding in
the absence of climate change ranges from 4.4
million in 1990 to 2.1–6.3 million in 2085
(depending on the scenario). Moreover, due to
the inertia of the climate system, mitigation
would not reduce the climate change compo-
nent of the problem significantly until a few
decades hade elapsed.
Mitigation has the additional problem that
it indiscriminately reduces all impacts of cli-
mate change whether they are positive or neg-
ative. But adaptation can selectively capture
the positive aspects of climate change while
reducing its negatives. And while the impacts
of global warming are uncertain, there is no
doubt that malaria, hunger, water stress, and
coastal flooding are real and urgent problems
here and now. Thus, focused adaptation is far
more likely to deliver benefits than is mitiga-
tion, and to deliver those benefits sooner
rather than later.
Significantly, work on focused adaptation
measures can commence, and in some areas
has already begun, without detailed knowl-
edge of the impacts of climate change. Cases
in point are the development of malaria vac-
cines, transferable property rights for water
resources, development of early warning sys-
tems for climate-sensitive events ranging
from storms to potential epidemics of various
kinds, and elucidation of mechanisms that
confer resistance in crops to drought, water
logging, or saline soils. To the extent that
such measures do not rely on the location-
specific details of impacts analyses, focused
adaptation reduces the risk of having wasted
resources by pouring them into problems
that may or may not occur at specific loca-
tions.69
Ancillary benefits of adaptation focused on
reducing vulnerability to malaria and hunger
include better health, increased economic
growth, and greater human capital, which
should advance human well-being and the
capacity to address a much wider variety of
problems.70 These co-benefits, in fact, are
among the goals and purposes of sustainable
development as articulated in the Millennium
Development Goals.71 In other words, focused
adaptation to reduce the vulnerability to exist-
ing climate-sensitive problems would advance
sustainable development in addition to explic-
itly laying the foundations for adapting to
future climate change. 
Finally, the conclusion that focused adap-
tation is for the foreseeable future superior in
terms of both global benefits and global costs
is robust to the choice of discount rates. That
is because the benefits of focused adaptation
will generally follow relatively soon after its











mate system’s inertia ensures that the costs of
emission reductions will have to be borne for
decades before any benefits accrue.
Examples of what focused adaptation
might entail are discussed below.
Malaria 
The UN Millennium project reports that
the global death toll from malaria could be
reduced by 75 percent at a cost of $3 billion
per year.72 Adaptations focused on reducing
current vulnerabilities to malaria include mea-
sures targeted specifically at malaria as well as
measures that would generally enhance the
capacity to respond to public health problems
and deliver public health services more effec-
tively and efficiently. Malaria-specific mea-
sures include indoor residual (home) spraying
with insecticides, insecticide-treated bed nets,
improved case management, more compre-
hensive antenatal care, and development of
safe, effective, and cheap vaccines and thera-
pies.73 Moreover, if these measures are even
partly successful, they could further reduce
the likelihood of outbreaks because the risk of
exposure would be lower. 
The posited expenditures may have to be
increased by the year 2085 to keep pace with
the projected increase in the global popula-
tion at risk from malaria in the absence of cli-
mate change (see Table 7). I will assume—
based on the ratio of estimated deaths in
2085 to that in 1990 under the A2 scenario
(the worst scenario for malaria) and round-
ing up to the nearest whole number—that
expenditures should be tripled, regardless of
the emission scenario, in order to reduce
malaria deaths by 75 percent.
Hunger 
An additional $5 billion annual investment
in agricultural R&D—approximately 15 per-
cent of global funding of agricultural research
and development during the 1990s—should
raise productivity sufficiently to more than
compensate for the estimated 0.02 percent
annual shortfall in productivity caused by cli-
mate change.74 As Table 2 shows, that should
reduce the total population at risk for hunger
in the future significantly more than the
largest estimated increase under any scenario
for the population at risk for hunger as a con-
sequence of climate change—particularly if the
additional investment is targeted toward solv-
ing developing countries’ current food and
agricultural problems that might be exacer-
bated by warming.
An alternative cost estimate can be derived
from the work of the UN Millennium Project,
which estimates that somewhere between 5
and 8 percent of the extra funding needed to
realize the MDGs would be required to reduce
global hunger by 50 percent in 2015.75 That
works out to less than $12 billion in 2010 and
about $15 billion in 2015.76 For the purpose of
this discussion, I will assume $15 billion per
year for the 2010–2015 period. 
Current agricultural problems that could be
exacerbated by warming and should be the focus
of vulnerability-reduction measures include
growing crops in poor climatic or soil conditions
(e.g., low-soil moisture in some areas, too much
water in others, or soils with high salinity, alka-
linity, or acidity). Because of warming, such con-
ditions could become more prevalent and agri-
culture might have to expand into areas with
poorer soils, or both. Actions focused on increas-
ing agricultural productivity under current mar-
ginal conditions would alleviate hunger in the
future whether or not the climate changes. 
Similarly, because both CO2 and tempera-
tures will increase, crop varieties should be
developed to take advantage of such condi-
tions.77 Progress on these approaches does not
depend on improving our skill in forecasting
location-specific details of climate change
impacts analyses. These focused adaptation
measures should be complemented by develop-
ment of higher-yield, lower-impact crop vari-
eties and improved agronomic practices so that
more food is produced per unit acre. That
would help reduce hunger while providing
numerous ancillary benefits for biodiversity
and sustainable development.78
Coastal Flooding 
According to estimates in the latest IPCC

















against a sea level rise of about 0.66 meters in
2100—equivalent to about 0.52 meters in 2085
compared with 0.34 meters under the warmest
(A1FI) scenario—would vary from $2.6 to $10
billion during the 21st century.79 I will assume
$10 billion for the purposes of this paper.
Governments could, moreover, discourage mal-
adaptation by refusing to subsidize insurance
and/or protective measures that allow individu-
als to offload private risks to the broader public.
Water Stress 
Although, as Table 3 shows, climate change
could relieve water stress, there are many mea-
sures that would help societies cope with pre-
sent and future water stress regardless of their
cause. Among them are institutional reforms
to treat water as an economic commodity by
allowing market pricing and transferable prop-
erty rights to water. Such reforms should stim-
ulate widespread adoption of existing but
underused conservation technologies and lead
to more private-sector investment in R&D,
which would reduce the demand for water by
all sectors. For example, new or improved crops
and techniques for more efficient use of water
in agriculture could enhance agricultural pro-
ductivity. That would provide numerous ancil-
lary benefits, including reductions in the risk
of hunger and pressures on freshwater biodi-
versity while also enhancing the opportunity
for other in-stream uses (e.g., recreation).
Notably, diversion of water to agricultural uses
might be the largest current threat to freshwa-
ter biodiversity.
Improvements in water conservation fol-
lowing such reforms are likely to be most pro-
nounced for the agricultural sector, which is
responsible for 85 percent of global water con-
sumption. A reduction of 18 percent in agri-
cultural water consumption would, on aver-
age, double the amount of water available for
all other uses.80
Sustainable Economic Development: 
A Third Approach
So far I have examined two approaches to
address warming through the foreseeable
future. The first, mitigation, would reduce
impacts—positive and negative—across the
board. That approach entails significant near-
term costs, whereas any payoff will be delayed
far into the future. The second approach,
focused adaptation, would reduce vulnerabili-
ty to climate-sensitive effects now through
2085 by focusing on individual threats and
attacking those threats simultaneously.
However, developing countries are most
at risk of climate change not because they
will experience greater climate change, but
because they lack adaptive capacity to cope
with its impacts. Hence, another approach to
addressing climate change would be to
enhance the adaptive capacity of developing
countries by promoting broad development,
i.e., economic development and human capi-
tal formation, which, of course, is the point
of sustainable economic development.81
Moreover, since the determinants of adaptive
and mitigative capacity are largely the same,
enhancing the former should also boost the
latter.82 Perhaps more important, advancing
economic development and human capital
formation would also advance society’s abili-
ty to cope with all manner of threats, whether
climate related or otherwise.83
One approach to estimating the costs and
benefits of sustainable economic development
is to examine the literature on the MDGs,
which were devised to promote sustainable
development in developing countries. The
benefits associated with these goals—halving
global poverty; halving hunger, halving the
lack of access to safe water and sanitation;
reducing child and maternal mortality by 66
percent or more; providing universal primary
education; and reversing growth in malaria,
AIDS/HIV, and other major diseases—would
exceed the benefits flowing from the deepest
mitigation (see Table 9). Yet, according to the
UN Millennium Project, the additional annu-
al cost to the richest countries of attaining the
MDGs by 2015 is pegged at about 0.5 percent
of their GDP.84 That is approximately the
same cost as that of the ineffectual, but costly,
Kyoto Protocol.
Since focused adaptation would only












to cope with its
impacts.
tainable economic development (e.g., malar-
ia, hunger, water stress) without necessarily
addressing other significant problems (e.g.,
poverty, access to safe water and sanitation,
illiteracy, child and maternal mortality),
broad pursuit of sustainable economic devel-
opment would, not surprisingly, deliver
greater benefits but could also cost more
than focused adaptation.85
Mitigation Versus Adaptation
Table 10 compares for the A1FI (warmest
but richest) and the A2 (poorest) emission
scenarios, the costs and benefits of two sce-
narios of mitigation—the Kyoto Protocol and
a halt in climate change as of 1990—against
two adaptation scenarios, namely, focused
adaptation and sustainable economic devel-
opment. In this table, benefits are provided
in terms of
• declines in mortality from hunger, malar-
ia, and coastal flooding,
• changes in net population at risk of
water stress, 
• progress toward the MDGs, and 
• habitat lost to cropland. 
This table shows that, at a cost of less than
$34 billion per year (for 2010–2015), focused
adaptation would deliver far greater benefits
than would even halting climate change.
Moreover, it would do so at one fifth the cost
of the ineffectual Kyoto Protocol. 
Given the sorry track record of external aid
over the past few decades—particularly where
institutions to bolster economic development,
human capital, and technological change are
weak and governance is poor—several analysts
are skeptical that external aid can ensure sus-
tainable economic development.86 As these ana-
lysts correctly note, sustainable economic devel-
opment can rarely, if ever, be imposed or pur-
chased from outside. The necessary institution-
al changes have to come from within.
Nevertheless, according to Table 10, even if the
UNMP’s target goals are met at only the 20 per-
cent level for whatever reason (e.g., corruption,
rosy cost estimates generated by the UN
Millennium Project, overconfidence in chances
of success, unforeseen circumstances) the resid-
ual benefits would exceed what can be obtained
through mitigation, at least through the fore-
seeable future, and probably at lower cost. 
Table 10 doesn’t show the differences
between the cumulative reductions in mortality
or population at risk between the present and
2085 due to the two adaptation options rela-
tive to the mitigation options. Given that
hunger, malaria, and coastal flooding would
be responsible for millions of deaths annually
between 1990 and 2085, these cumulative
reductions ought to be very large indeed,87
perhaps in the range of all deaths in wars,
genocide, and other atrocities during the 20th
century, which one estimate pegs at 231 mil-
lion people.88 Thus, consideration of the
cumulative reductions would favor either
adaptation approach, because unlike mitiga-
tion, adaptation will also reduce present-day
climate-sensitive problems in the near-to-
medium term, and will start to provide a
steady stream of benefits in the very near term.
By contrast, because of the inertia of the cli-
mate system, the benefits of mitigation will
not be significant until decades have elapsed.
Adaptive Management of
Climate Change Risks
It has sometimes been argued that it is
only fair that present generations expend
resources on mitigation now, instead of leav-
ing future generations with a bigger mess
and a larger clean-up bill. But as the data pre-
sented thus far clearly demonstrates, well-
being tomorrow is best enhanced by adapta-
tion, or sustainable development, or both—
not by mitigation.
In light of the benefits associated with
focused adaptation and sustainable develop-
ment, the most cost-effective and compre-
hensive policies to address climate change in
the near-to-medium term will eschew direct
greenhouse gas emission controls that go
beyond “no-regret” policies, that is, policies
that would entail no net costs. Instead, poli-
20
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cymakers should work to enhance adapta-
tion and promote economic development.
First, policymakers should work toward
increasing adaptive capacity, particularly in
developing countries, by promoting efforts to
reduce vulnerability to today’s urgent climate-
sensitive problems—malaria, hunger, water
stress, flooding, and other extreme events—that
might be exacerbated by climate change.89 The
technologies, human capital, and institutions
that will need to be strengthened or developed
to accomplish this will also be critical in
addressing these very problems in the future if
and when they are aggravated by climate
change. Increasing adaptive capacity might also
increase the level at which GHG concentration
would need to be stabilized to “prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system,” which is the stated “ultimate
objective” of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change.90 Alternatively, increasing
adaptive capacity could postpone the deadline
for stabilization. In either case, it could reduce
the costs of meeting the ultimate objective. 
Second, policymakers should strengthen or
develop the institutions necessary to advance
and/or reduce barriers to economic growth,
human capital, and the propensity for techno-
logical change. Doing so would improve both
adaptive and mitigative capacities, as well as
the prospects for sustainable development.91
Third, policymakers should implement no-
regret mitigation measures now, while expand-
ing the range and diversity of future no-regret
options. The latter could be advanced by re-
search and development to improve existing—
and develop new—technologies that would
reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas concentra-
tions more cost-effectively than currently possi-
ble. Should new information indicate that
more aggressive mitigation action is necessary,
future emission reductions might then be
cheaper, even if they have to be deeper to com-
pensate for a delay in a more aggressive
response in the short term. 
Fourth, policymakers should allow the
market to run its course in implementing no-
regret (i.e., no-cost) options. Among other
things, that implies reducing subsidies that
directly or indirectly increase energy use, land
clearance, coastal development, and other
activities that contribute to greater greenhouse
gas emissions or climate change damages. 
As part of this effort, OECD nations
should also reduce, if not eliminate, agricul-
tural subsidies and barriers to trade. Not only
are such subsidies and barriers expensive for
consumers in OECD nations, they damage
the economies and well-being of many devel-
oping nations whose economies and employ-
ment are dominated by the agricultural sec-
tor.92
Ironically, one of the arguments advanced
for rapid reductions in greenhouse gases is that
it would help developing countries who are
considered to be least able to cope with climate
change because they currently lack the neces-
sary economic and human capital to imple-
ment adaptive technologies. Reducing such
subsidies would go some way toward relieving
a major reason of concern for climate change. 
Fifth, policymakers should develop a more
robust understanding of the science, impacts,
and policies of climate change in order to
develop response strategies that would fore-
stall “dangerous” impacts of climate change
(per Article 2 of the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change) while at the same
time advancing human well-being.
Sixth, policymakers should monitor the
impacts of climate change to give advance
warning of “dangerous” impacts and, if neces-
sary, to rearrange priorities should the adverse
impacts of warming on human and environ-
mental well-being occur faster, threaten to be
more severe, or threaten to be more likely than
is currently projected. 
Together, these policies constitute an adap-
tive management approach to addressing cli-
mate change that would help solve today’s
urgent problems while bolstering our ability to
address tomorrow’s climate change challenge.
Conclusion
Climate change is not now—nor is it likely












important environmental problem facing
the globe, unless present-day problems such
as hunger, water-related diseases, lack of
access to safe water and sanitation, and
indoor air pollution are reduced drastically.
Otherwise, with respect to human well-being,
it will continue to be outranked by these
other problems and, with respect to environ-
mental well-being, by habitat loss and other
threats to biodiversity.
Through 2085, human well-being is likely
to be highest under the richest-but-warmest
(A1FI) scenario and lowest for the poorest
(A2) scenario. Matters may be best in the
A1FI world for some critical environmental
indicators through 2100, but not necessarily
for others. Either focused adaptation or
broad pursuit of sustainable development
would provide far greater benefits than even
the deepest mitigation—and at no greater
cost than that of the barely effective Kyoto
Protocol. 
For the foreseeable future, people will be
wealthier—and their well-being higher—than
is the case for present generations both in the
developed and developing worlds and with or
without climate change. The well-being of
future inhabitants in today’s developing
world would exceed that of the inhabitants of
today’s developed world under all but the
poorest scenario. Future generations should,
moreover, have greater access to human capi-
tal and technology to address whatever prob-
lems they might face, including climate
change. Hence the argument that we should
shift resources from dealing with the real and
urgent problems confronting present genera-
tions to solving potential problems of tomor-
row’s wealthier and better positioned genera-
tions is unpersuasive at best and verging on
immoral at worst.
Equally important, resources expended
on solving today’s climate-sensitive problems
and advancing sustainable economic devel-
opment will build human capital, advance
technology, and enhance the adaptive and
mitigative capacities of future generations.
If one believes that developed countries
have a moral and ethical obligation to deal
with climate change, that obligation cannot,
and should not, be met through aggressive
emission reductions at this time—“cannot”
because the planet is already committed to
some climate change—and “should not”
because the threats that climate change
would exacerbate can be reduced more effec-
tively, not to mention more economically,
through focused efforts to reduce vulnerabil-
ity or through broader efforts to advance eco-
nomic development. Any such obligation is
best discharged through efforts to reduce
present-day vulnerabilities to climate-sensi-
tive problems that are urgent and could be
exacerbated by climate change.
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